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REVIEW$
TnE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND. By Fred P. Graham. New York: The
Macmillan Company. 1970. Pp. x, 377. $7.95.
Since declarations of neutrality often portend savage partisanship
it was with some skepticism that I read the preface of Mr. Graham's
book in which he styled himself a "neutral" observer of the Warren
Court and its criminal law revolution. He does indeed have an outlook
favorable to the Warren revolution discernible in such comments as:
"the differences from state to state in the treatment of persons who
ran afoul of the law had become intolerable in a nation where state
lines had come to mean so little."1 If, as I am willing to assume, Mr.
Graham is reflecting not a peculiar prejudice but a basic outlook of
our times, it is testimony to the erosion of the old federalist principle
that, far from being per se a reproach to the administration of justice,
the existence of various centers of governmental power and the con-
sequent multiplicity of legal rights was an essential bulwark of political
liberty in this country. Everyone is entitled to a basic set of preposses-
sions, however, and I am happy to confirm that Mr. Graham is as
neutral as I ever expect anyone to get. A certain catholicity is needed
to distribute criticism all the way from Justice Douglas2 to F.B.I.
Director Hoover.8
The author, who is The New York Times reporter covering the
Supreme Court and Justice Department, occupied a uniquely advan-
tageous position to observe the dramatis personae of constitutional
change during the critical period covered in this book. I do not mean
that he tells tales out of school or engages in Rodelian muckraking,
although I recall one remark which does not raise the tone of the book.
When a liberal Justice of the Supreme Court is called "flexible" in his
principles, and the "flexibility" illustrated by his alleged withdrawal
of the appointment of a law clerk because of criticism of the young
man's protest activities in the southern press, you have the kind of
innuendo a newspaperman ought to avoid. More in the spirit of good
humor is the epigram comparing Justice Black's pre-judicial political
indiscretions with his record on the Court.4
The author's knowledgeability extends beyond anecdotes con-
cerning the Justices. It occasionally furnishes interesting insights into
1 F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INLicrn WouND 4 (1970) [hereinafter GRAHAM].
2Id. at 51.
3 Id. at 71, 257.
4 It is not the place of a review to steal the author's jokes, so the reader is referred
to page 49 of the book.
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the vagaries that can influence the process of decision itself. One
instance is the series of decisions on the retroactive application of
newly created rights of criminal defendants. Constitutional doctrine,
however startling, used to be thought of as theoretically timeless and
as applicable to old criminal convictions as to the case in which they
were announced. It was possible, therefore, that convicts long in prison
could compel reexamination of their conviction through federal
habeas corpus. While the impact of this possibility was formerly
dampened by deference to state procedural forfeiture rules, the case
of Fay v. Noia,5 in 1963, eliminated this barrier -thus opening the
door to the application of new rules to old trials in which they had
never been dreamed available. When the first major step in the criminal
law revolution came in Mapp v. Ohio,6 the search and seizure case, the
author suggests that the retroactivity problem was not foreseen until
the Court had already routinely and uncritically applied the rule to
a few convictions based on pre-Mapp trials not yet final when Mapp
came down. The Court then saved what it could in Linkletter v.
Walker7 by holding the Mapp rule inapplicable to convictions that
had become final by the date of Mapp. The Court, according to the
author, was about to apply the Linkletter cutoff rule to the Miranda
v. Arizona" confession case when the Justices realized that such a
distinction would result in reversing the convictions of some heinous
offenders and affirming those of some who, in the author's words, "had
been treated rather shabbily by the police." The author intimates that
the enormity of the crimes of some appellants led the Court, especially
Chief Justice Warren, to search for a rule of retroactivity which would
exclude them. In a last minute scramble, the retroactivity case was
severed from the Miranda appeal and handed down the following week
with a change from the previous pattern. The Miranda rule was to be
applicable only to trials occurring after the date of that decision. Trials
that took place after Miranda which used confessions obtained pre-
viously were still left within the rule. Pure prospectivity, of which
the author approves, was not attained until the holding of United
States v. Wade,9 affording the right of counsel at lineups, was applied
only to lineups held thereafter. 10
The author is in his element when analyzing politics. One of
5 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
8 867 U.S. 643 (1961).
7 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
8 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
10 GRAHAM 192.
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the great ironies of the Court's revolution in defendant's rights was
its concurrence with the staggering growth of crime in the United
States. While there is some question of the effect of court decisions
on crime, there is little doubt of their effect on the politics of crime,
and as the author put it, "crime replaced communism as the hobgoblin
of American politics."" The Court's contribution to this phenomenon
was widely viewed as "a sort of judicial nymphomania, a compulsion to
bestow the favors of justice too freely, which the critics saw as a weak-
ness of liberal thinking."'12
The treatment of political pressures on the law is enriched through
an unfailing historical perspective of the several areas of criminal
procedure. For example, we are given a full development of the rela-
tion of the Bill of Rights to the fourteenth amendment from Barron
v. Baltimore,"" through Adamson v. California,4 to the present tech-
nique of selective incorporation under which the Bill of Rights was
converted from a set of restraints on federal power into personal
guarantees of freedom from governmental abuse. The author's ex-
planation of these developments, strong on factual detail, is a model of
clarity and dramatic appeal, even to such recondite subjects as federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners. Through actual illustrations of
abuses corrected, we see the conflict between the search for the needle
of injustice in the haystack of state convictions and the corrosive
effect such a remedy has on the finality without which state convictions
can be neither a deterrent to the criminal nor an impetus to rehabilita-
tion of the convict.
Similar journalistic talents are manifest in the comprehensive
discussion of the search and seizure guarantee of the fourth amendment
from before Wolf v. Colorado15 to the present problems of stop-and-
frisk and electronic eavesdropping. Singled out for special treatment
is the danger inherent in police searches without a warrant, as exacer-
bated by the Supreme Court decisions scrutinizing warrants so micro-
scopically as to discourage their use by police. The discussion gives
point to the old quip that trial courts search for truth and appellate
courts search for error. Although the continuity of the search and
seizure discussion and that of electronic eavesdropping is annoyingly
interrupted by a chapter on lawyers and lineups, the eventual treat-
ment of eavesdropping is knowledgeable, factually as well as legally.
11id. at 11.
12Id. at 16.
1332 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
14 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
15 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
[Vol. 45
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The irrationality of the traditional law is exposed through a discussion
of Olmstead v. United States'16 and Goldman v. United States.'7 The
political dangers inherent in indiscriminate wiretapping are exempli-
fied by the federal taps on prominent Negro leaders such as Dr. Martin
Luther King and Elijah Muhammad.:' The chapter closes with refer-
ence to the brewing crisis over whether the Judiciary or the Executive
shall supervise and control electronic surveillance of the nation's vio-
lent revolutionary movement.
Despite Ramsey Clark's soothing assurance in 1968 that "the level
of crime has risen a little bit, but there is no crime wave in this coun-
try,"'19 two chapters of this book are devoted to a probing survey of
crime statistics which prove that a crime wave is indeed sweeping this
country. Even after discounting improved crime reporting techniques
and other factors that might affect statistical reports, the figures confirm
what is obvious to anyone who has his eyes open to conditions today
and a reliable memory of how they were ten and twenty years ago. Cer-
tain crimes by their nature are always reported, e.g., bank robberies,
which rose 248 percent from 1960 to 1967, and assaults by gun, which
rose 84 percent in the five years from 1962 to 1967. While conceding
that the much maligned Uniform Crime Reports of the F.B.I. seem
to have been vindicated by conditions no longer open to dispute, the
author nevertheless aims his severest criticism of the book at the F.B.I.
and J. Edgar Hoover personally for the flair for publicity with which
they use "crime docks" and other techniques of dramatizing crime
statistics. Mr. Graham views this as an attempt to "wring the maximum
amount of terror out of the public." No such strictures are addressed
to the academic criminologists who, it is conceded, underplayed the
problem in their public pronouncements if not in their professional
journals. The most solemn duty the state has to perform is the pro-
tection of the physical security of its citizens. To carp on the niceties
of public disclosure of government's massive failure in this task seems
to me to come with ill grace from a newspaperman.
More in the tradition of journalism than bemoaning the F.B.I.'s
over-dramatization of criminal statistics is the author's revelation that,
for a benevolent purpose, the National Violence Commission sup-
pressed a set of alarming statistics on Negro crime. While Mr. Graham
does not question the motives of the Commission members and refrains
16 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
18 GPAi 259.
19 Id. 69.
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from characterizing the withholding of the data, he candidly publishes
the statistics in his notes20 and discusses the serious national implica-
tions in a chapter devoted to race and crime. Although not skirting the
relationship between black social militancy and its spillover into crim-
inal retaliation against white society, the author correctly assesses the
historical blame. "This is the ultimate product, most experts feel, of
the economic and cultural ravages of a segregated system that has been
presided over by whites." 21 After reading the current statistics and the
criminologists' projection that things will get worse before they get
better, it is difficult to argue with the conclusion that "it seems in-
evitable that race and crime will become firmly linked in the public
mind, and that the Supreme Court and other institutions that are
caught up in the crime crisis will be affected by it."122
The author reserves his gloomiest forecast for the fate of the con-
fession code which the Court created in Miranda v. Arizona,23 the
case he had in mind when he titled the book. The tension that pre-
ceded the Miranda decision is reflected in the 40 appeals that the
Court had held up for more than a year, marked "E.C." by the court
clerk to indicate that they were Escobedo cases -a reference to the
enigmatic 1964 decision 24 in which the Court departed from the volun-
tariness test and found a confession inadmissible because a lawyer had
been denied access to his client during the interrogation. Undoubtedly
impatient with the gradual pace of criminal law reform in the states,
frustrated by the traditional case-by-case determination of voluntari-
ness, and obviously intending to protect the ignorant against the im-
pulse to answer questions designed to elicit admissions of guilt, the
Miranda Court grasped the nettle and extended the fifth amendment
freedom from compelled testimony to include the furnishing of a set
of warnings. What has been accurately called the dominant impulse
of modern constitutional law, egalitarianism, 25 also informed the deci-
sion. If the wealthy and intelligent criminal could be aware of and
advised against inadvertently stumbling into the hands of justice, then
the poor and ignorant offender ought to be furnished with equality of
opportunity. Consequently, what was originally a restraint on govern-
mental power to use external compulsion in obtaining involuntary ad-
missions became an affirmative governmental obligation to apply an
20 Id. 340.
21 Id. 90.
22 Id. 88.
23 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
25 A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 86 (1968).
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external check on voluntary admissions. Yet critics of Miranda can
always take comfort in the thought that the decision was not as extreme
as it might have been. We shall probably never know what was present
to former Justice Fortas' imagination when he characterized Miranda
as "a conservative decision."28
The congressional attempt, embodied in the Crime Control Act
of 1968,27 to replace the Miranda rule in the federal courts with the
former voluntariness test is explained not as legal myopia in reading
the constitutional basis for the decision but as a realistic guess at the
likelihood of a change in position by a reconstituted Court.28 The
author quotes Senator McClellan as saying privately that the bill
was his "petition for a rehearing" on Miranda.29 While this sort of
temporal forum shopping is not edifying, the possible accuracy of
Senator McClellan's prediction must be laid at the door of a Court that
can hope for as little respect from its successors as it has shown its pre-
decessors.
While the author characterizes the Miranda decision as "an ex-
ercise in benevolent authoritarianism by the judiciary,"30 his objection
does not derive from any principled limitation on judicial power.
His reasons are solely pragmatic. The decision simply could not and
will not succeed. The power to get itself accepted in the political mar-
ketplace and nothing more pretentious is what the author means by
legitimacy. Since judicial reform directed at police practices in the
street and stationhouse are more difficult to supervise than courtroom
procedures, a restraint that goes so thoroughly against the grain of law
enforcers is bound to wind up as more of a symbolic irritant than a
"successful" reform.
The reference to Miranda in the title of the book is taken from
The Supreme Court of the United States31 written by the late Chief
Justice Hughes during his few years out of high public office. It is more
than coincidence that that work is also the locus classicus for the "the
constitution is what the judges say it is" school of thought which Mr.
Graham seems to endorse with the Machiavellian gloss of "if they can
get away with it." The cynic of the old cult of the robe used to regard
it quite proper for the Court to stand in the same relation to the Con-
stitution as Edgar Bergen stands to Charlie McCarthy, as long as no
26 GpAHM 182.
27 18 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
28 Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
29GRHM 320.
80 Id. 157.
81 C. HuGmS, THB Stuwaz CoURT or Tim UNrIW STATES (1928).
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one saw its lips move. The modern cynic doesn't even mind if the lips
are seen to move as long as the audience likes what it hears. I do not
believe the new cynicism is any closer to the truth than the old. Like
Holmes' bad man theory of law, it may tell the wilful and lawless how
far they may defeat the law's purposes without being called to account,
but it gives no guidance to the honest judge who wants to give effect
to the Constitution's purposes, not his own.
Of the trend of decision culminating in Miranda, some distin-
guished jurists are in accord with the late Judge John J. Parker,
who commented in disbelief: "It is hard for a lawyer to really think
. .. that this is the law in this country now - but it is 1"32 Since most
men, however, have an infinite capacity for accommodating their judg-
ment to the current fashions in belief, it will remain for a later genera-
tion of lawyers to evaluate the present body of criminal procedure law.
In the meantime I recommend Lord Chesterfield's advice to his son:
The things which happen in our own times, and which we see
ourselves, do not surprise us near so much as the things which we
read of in times past, though not in the least more extraordinary;
... when Caligula made his horse a Consul, the people of Rome,
at the time, were not greatly surprised at it, having been in some
degree prepared for it, by an insensible gradation of extravagan-
des from the same quarter.3
BERNARD E. GEGAN*
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS. By Jerrold G. Van Cise. New
York: Practising Law Institute, 1970 Ed. Pp. xii, 363. $20.00.
What one has done in a book, at least as to substantive content,
should be judged by what the author purported to do. Mr. Van Cise
tells us that his book is written for the general practitioner, and that
[i]nitially, there will appear in these pages a brief historical review
of how our antitrust principles have evolved over the centuries -
not in quiet-but in the stream of life. Thereafter, the statutes
and cases will be analyzed; the procedures for dealing with them
will be described; the application and enforcement of their pro-
32 GRAHAm 109.
33 Letter from Philip Dormer Stanhope, Fourth Earl of Chesterfield to Philip Stan-
hope, Sept. 13, 1748, in LORD CHEsTERFmD, LurrEas To His SON AND ORmms 68-69 (Every.
man ed. 1929).
* Professor of Law, St. John's University.
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